Do You Really Care About the Democrats?
David Steiger
Is there any way for the Democrats to avoid a seemingly fixed annihilation in the coming electoral cycles? Much has been made of Ezra Klein’s recent NY Times piece “David Shor Is Telling Democrats What They Don’t Want To Hear” wherein he explains, dissects, and casually flirts with Shor’s view of the purported forces that currently beset the electoral prospects of Dems moving forward. Now, in light of the Virginia debacle and the brink of bedlam in New Jersey, it’s not inconceivable that the Democrats would readily heed the verdict espoused by someone like Shor. For those unaware, David Shor is a fairly well-known, highly-respected data scientist, formerly employed by the Obama administration, who now spends his days crunching numbers and neurons so that giddy Democratic strategists and consultants can quarrel over which approach is conducive with long-term success. Conventional wisdom says such deliberations are a symptom of the year-round political media circus we’ve grown accustomed to, but recent failures and historical precedent suggest that there may be a kernel of pertinent wisdom couched in his assessment, after all. Incidentally, political narratives are quite essential for the incumbent party, as queasy palms grow sweaty awaiting the 2022 midterms, not to mention a potential trequel bout against a rested, vengeful Trump in 2024.
As for Shor’s declaration of impending doom, the basis of his critique comes down to poor messaging. He argues that it would behoove democrats to focus more on messaging around issues and policies that poll fairly well with the general public—henceforth deemed “popularism”—in order to win elections in states that have more Republican-friendly voters. From an electoral perspective, this discourse broaches a poignant dichotomy of appeal in terms of molding the party brand and allocating resources for election cycles: Will Democrats gain more from increasing turnout from their base, or by persuading active voters who stand to vote Republican? While the former boasts some merit on the basis of upticks in negative partisanship and anti-Trump sentiment, the latter is more convincingly supported by empirical findings from political scientists. Like it or not, they affirm a fairly strong case in favor of nominating moderate candidates to run for seats in slightly-red to purple districts (or states).
A 2015 paper from political scientist Andrew B. Hall instantiates claims of a moderate advantage for house swing races. His study “What Happens When Extremists Win Primaries?” shows that nominating an extreme candidate over a moderate candidate can elicit an “extremism penalty,” where the general election vote decreases considerably and the subsequent roll-call representation (i.e. ideological makeup) of the district switches to become more liberal or conservative, opposing the ideological bent of whichever extreme candidate is elected. A follow up study from Hall titled “Who Punishes Extremist Nominees? Candidate Ideology and Turning Out the Base in US Elections” corroborated his previous findings, as elected officials who were more extreme extended a gift to the opposing party by activating it’s base without garnering the necessary ideological support from their own base to counter this surge in turnout. I suppose the eminent political scientist Clinton Rossiter was onto something when proclaimed in his famous work Parties and politics in America: “No America without democracy, no democracy without politics, no politics without parties, and parties without compromise and moderation.” Yes, it seems the nefarious moderate is here to stay.
So, with complicity in touting moderates (and discernible rancor over Manchin and Sinema’s untimely weaponization of this very concept), will young progressives and leftists ever receive anything in return for their investment in the Democratic party? Good News! The overarching purpose of conveying this electoral wisdom is to distill an imperative clarity: That we can move the country leftward ideologically to pave the way for major policies, without ceding unchecked political control to the Republican party. This electoral calculus acknowledges the necessity of party loyalty and proper branding (voting for Dems), while recognizing the simultaneous feasibility of garnering public support for certain ideas and policies through an incisive messaging apparatus. Thus, we can mold a brighter future in the aspiring image of justice and prosperity.
I think Klein encapsulates what Shor views as the left’s fatal flaw in courting right-leaning voters when he says: “[young liberal democrats] they need to internalize that they are not like and do not understand the voters they need to win over. Swing voters in these states are not liberals, are not woke and do not see the world in the way that the people who staff and donate to Democratic campaigns do.” To some extent, this is true. Young people with strong, fervently left-wing positions on an array of issues are highly susceptible to engaging with a parochial version of the electorate that they’ve concocted in their personal world, where all makes sense under the decree of a set of convenient axioms. This myopia is self-perpetuating, because when the electorate votes against policies or ideas that are ostensibly supported by an overwhelming majority of the American people, the young left-winger can attribute the defeat to the inherent brainwashing propagated by the system. This is not to suggest that systemic explanations don’t play a role, or that corporate elites can’t disseminate propaganda to sway public opinion—but given the entrenched influence of these malevolent factors, the stark reality of the mass public’s linkage to the electoral process must be acknowledged and properly maneuvered if Democrats want to keep winning close elections.
Shor has noted in previous interviews that there’s utility to the incremental approach of enacting change, which is evidenced by the substantial gains made by other nations in expanding their social safety net. It’s important to note that this approach is not founded merely on the basis of policy alone, but rather an ideological shift in terms of how citizens conceive of a generous welfare state. Shor calls this “building a modern welfare state,” citing the persistent struggle of the Australian Social Democrats going back to the 1970s. It’s clear that scores of young Dems are keen to accelerate this process of reviving America's working-class, but lest we forget that messaging to voters must be finely-tuned to appeal to less-educated, less-liberal, and overall less-politically engaged voters. The Democrats have historically operated as the party of the working-class, but that doesn't mean their constituency is wholly liberal—in fact, appealing to a bloc of working-class, socially conservatives voters is something Shor made note of under Obama. He tweeted earlier this year “Obama tried very hard to placate working class conservatives in his messaging, which is why he did better with them than any Democrat in decades and enjoyed a substantial structural advantage in the electoral college.” Once again, the impetus in this equation is the matter of messaging, rather than particularities of policy. Proposals like “Defund the Police,” regardless of their merit, enfeeble Democratic messengers with horrendous optics when they’re vying to win over social conservatives on the basis of economic populism. It’s important to remember that most non-white conservatives vote for Democrats, but perceived extremism or “radical agendas” can chip away at this support.
The 2020 election, for example, with all its tumultuousness surrounding racial injustice and policing in America, saw Trump increase his support from non-white voters, likely on the basis of magnifying alleged extremeness from the Democrats on certain issues (yes, the “socialism” label hurt Dems with latino voters). This can be a tough pill to swallow for young Dems, because we never want to win elections through means that exacerbate structural inequalities or disregard marginalized groups, but the messaging doesn’t have to match the policy with perfect symmetry. If anyone understands this it’s the “Trumpist, populist, paleoconservative” pastiche that Republicans sell to working-class voters, while cutting corporate taxes and union busting. Their messaging stokes a pro-worker sentiment, despite acting to the contrary, and the Democrats should understand that avoiding certain unfavorable topics in messaging doesn’t necessitate neglecting said topics on the policy level. In fact, the left’s very own Medicare 4 All maestro, Matt Bruenig, wrote a blog post response to Shor’s assessment called “Popularism and the Child Tax Credit,” where he notes that “Popularism does not tell us to do popular things and not do unpopular things. It tells us to talk about popular things and not talk about unpopular things, all while doing whatever we want.” Perhaps he’s exaggerating with that last part, but it’s not a ridiculous insight regarding contemporary politics. Most voters don’t cast their ballot merely on the basis of policy, so it’s important to curate messaging that appeals to widely-held identities, rather than just pages of policy wonkery. As for those who do recognize policy, the economic gains they reap from something like a tax credit, wage increase, or healthcare expansion may be rewarded (according to stat guru Nate Silver, economic progressivism is actually quite favorable with the proper blend of conveying moderation on “culture war” disputes), which attests to the importance of Democrats winning elections. Many of the Democrats currently serving in congress are technically “moderates,” but they all lined up back in March to support President Biden’s American Rescue Plan, a landmark piece of legislation with widespread support and demonstrable benefits (including a Child Tax Credit that should’ve been extended, MR. JOE MANCHIN). Now aside from providing much-needed material support for Americans, the underlying fulcrum of the American Rescue Plan fundamentally rejects the dogma behind the supply-side scheme revered by the right’s economic elite, in favor of a more worker-oriented, bottom-up approach to rebuilding the American economy. As Econ Blogger Noah Smith noted in his pithily titled post “Bidenomics, explained,” it was quite the noteworthy paradigm shift.
But how does the left win elections? The aforementioned Hall moderate study can be sobering for progressives trying to run on generally-popular economic policies in more contentious districts, but what if I told you….that Hall’s first study actually evinces a fecund opportunity for ardent progressives, like Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY)? If you comb through the study, you’ll find that Hall's findings suggest that the notorious “extremism penalty” is, in fact, nullified for races in what one might call “safe districts.” These are districts where the electorate leans heavily in one ideological direction (~ 60% or more liberal or conservative), which means candidates who are ideologically extreme, but still track in proximity with the median voter in their district, are completely palatable. While electing more progressive representatives in select safe districts isn’t game-changing on the policy-level, it can shift the overton window (the range of acceptable policies for the mainstream population) to the left, encourage progressive coalition-building in congress, and extend more bargaining power to said coalitions.
It’s also possible to shift public opinion from within the party itself. The frequent debate topics and policy agendas pushed by the bevy of Democratic candidates during the 2020 primary exhibited remarkable evidence of a leftward shift, which was especially heartening on a national stage. The party recognizes the changing direction of its voters, and this dynamic aligns well with findings from a study in 2014 titled “Informing the Electorate? How Party Cues and Policy Information Affect Public Opinion about Initiatives,” which illustrated how citizens are willing to change their position on a policy when presented with strong, new evidence to support it, even if it happens to buck the widely-held position of their party. Political scientists have noted that many voters suffer from an “electoral blindspot,” meaning they’re not informed enough to distinguish between two candidates who have clear ideological differences. This is fortuitous for intense policy demanders attempting to change people’s minds, because it means voters aren’t unwilling to switch positions on ideological issues since they don’t have many strong positions to begin with. The people can be reached with the right messaging, commitment to packaging evidence with exoteric appeal, and reliable advocacy from activists and intense policy demanders.
This process will take time, given the current makeup of the electorate. The GOP’s incessant appeal to culture war fodder presumes that, right now, the median voter is fairly skeptical of—and potentially disgruntled by—the kind of esoteric left-wing cultural politics imbued in many Democratic campaigns and college campuses. Hearkening back to the Shor, this tide is undeniable: Dems would be remiss to overlook the huge age and education gap that exists between the two respective parties' rank-and-file is an ominous impediment to grapple with as the party moves forward. Consider what the bespectacled bravura of blogging himself, Matt Yglesias, wrote for his substack “Say your goal is to persuade people not to pander to their existing views — well, you need to know who you are hoping to persuade.” The Democrats’ messaging strategy ought to reflect not just a willingness, but a stanchless determination to set the record straight regarding their vision for the country. Even if a party is nothing more to you than a means to an end, embrace the apparatus for the perks it confers. Don’t allow the playthings of political hobbyism to shackle you to the guardrail of government’s woebegone: it’s essential to realize that while progressive idealism can be a catalyzing framework for operation, one must engage with electoral realism as a necessary feat for building lasting solidarity.