2020 + 1: Virginia’s Off-Year Election and Why it Matters
Aryan Deorah
As election night came to a close in 2013, progressive Democrat Terry McCauliffe took the stage to celebrate a monumental victory in the swing state of Virginia. Due to a strong third party presence, he lacked a majority of the vote, and his win was decided by narrow yet decisive margins. Virginia had been solidly red in the post-civil rights era until Obama surprisingly swept the state in 2008, winning it again by a considerable margin in 2012. Growing DC suburbs and shifting demographics of Asian immigrants in the 21st century made Virginia a prime flip for the Democrats, and with McCauliffe as the first Democratic governor in decades, Virginia continued its blue shift.
He didn’t waste any time getting to work, playing a major role in expanding Obamacare, funding schools, providing for critical social programs in Virginia, and fulfilling progressive promises he made to his voters, making him rather popular. McCauliffe paved the way for further liberal victories: By 2020, Virginia had elected McCauliffe’s Lieutenant Governor, Ralph Northam, in a landslide victory, its state senate and house were both blue, and Democrats had flipped several key US House seats. Virginia Democrats seemed unstoppable, which is why when the 2021 gubernatorial election rolled around, no one expected Republican Glenn Youngkin, a Trump-endorsed upstart businessman, to stand a chance against the once popular former Governor McCauliffe. But Youngkin would, very much like his opponent did 8 years ago, take a surprising victory on election night in my home state, once again shifting Virginia’s political future.
So what happened? Why was Youngkin able to pull off a stunning upset while Democrats fell short of their expectations once again? Though there are many factors, I believe the primary one lies in the sheer contrast between the candidates’ campaigns. McCauliffe had a 2020 + 1 strategy in which he tied his campaign to the Biden administration while attacking Youngkin for his ties to Trump. Establishment Democrats including Biden, Obama, and Harris all made their way down to Virginia to campaign on behalf of McCauliffe, sticking to national talking points about what the Biden administration was trying to accomplish and how McCauliffe would support those national policies in Virginia. McCauliffe tried to rile up anger against Trump for the Capitol riots and his attempts to steal the 2020 election, and repeatedly ran ads about Youngkin accepting Trump’s endorsement (which played a key part in Youngkin winning the Republican primaries).
In sticking to 2020 talking points, McCauliffe missed the mark on the localized issues that faced Virginians. While Virginians were focusing on the pandemic and its effects on the economy and education, McCauliffe overlooked the pandemic to discuss national political issues and when he did address the pandemic, he took an attitude of maintaining the status quo in regards to the sluggish pace of economic recovery and a slow return to normal. He made numerous unforced errors: while parents and suburban residents were angry about school closures, he insisted on campaigning with the president of the teachers’ union responsible for keeping schools closed. When many across the spectrum were afraid of and confused about Critical Race Theory, rather than address those concerns, he told them their voices shouldn’t matter in their children’s education.
Youngkin’s campaign could not have been more different. While Youngkin was endorsed by Trump, he chose to distance himself from the far-right movement and made it clear to Trump not to campaign in Virginia. While McCauliffe positioned himself as an establishment candidate who knows how to get things done, Youngkin chose to be the outsider underdog, fighting the corrupt establishment. Well aware of Biden’s blowout in Virginia the year before, Younkin chose to stay clear of national politics, and focussed much of his efforts going from suburb to suburb, flipping voters dissatisfied with the Democratic response to the pandemic.
Youngkin doubled down on each misstep McCauliffe made, and tapped into the parental anger at schools over critical race theory, transgender policy, school closures, and mask mandates. Virginia has served as a particular flashpoint for the issues, especially since a riot occurred and protests have persisted at school board meetings of my alma mater (Loudoun County Public Schools) that have caught national attention. Youngkin’s charisma contributed to massive Republican turnout, including near presidential turnout in rural communities, while McCauliffe’s lack of charisma and general complicitness by Democrats led to depressed turnout among McCauliffe supporters, explaining why McCauliffe underperformed his Democratic predecessors in virtually every county.
Virginia’s gubernatorial elections are unique in three notable ways. First, Virginia is the only state to limit governors to one term, which was why McCauliffe ran in the first place since current Governor Northam could not. The quick cycling of leadership makes it harder for politicians to gain an established and lasting presence in the state. This limits the advantage given to incumbent parties, allowing for more unpredictability in the election results.
Secondly, Virginia has some of the least restrictive voter policy in the country, with no voter ID laws, 45 days of early in-person voting, and easily available options for voting absentee. This allows for high voter turnout rates, even in off-year elections. Given the modern voter wars, a common myth that higher turnout rates help Democrats is deeply ingrained into American politics. Because of this, Republicans often work to make voting harder in states they control, while Democrats work to make it easier for people to vote. 26% more people voted in the 2021 gubernatorial election than in the 2017 one, yet the extra turnout seemed to benefit Republicans, not Democrats, dispelling the myth that higher turnout always helps Democrats win.
Finally and most importantly, gubernatorial elections are off-year, making Virginia one of two states alongside New Jersey that hold gubernatorial elections the year after presidential elections. Given Virginia’s status as a swing state, the results of its elections are often used as a bellwether for the country’s attitude as a whole towards the recently elected administration across the Potomac in DC. Going into election day, Biden’s popularity was about as low as it had ever been, being considerably underwater. General dissatisfaction with the Biden administration over a lack of notable accomplishments, the Afghanistan withdrawal, and an inability to get the country fully back on track all reflected on the 2021 elections, explaining underperformances by Democrats in both gubernatorial elections.
Virginia’s election results are also used to provide insight into what may happen in the midterms the following year. Given past elections Democrats may be in for some dejavu: the last time Democrats lost a Virginia gubernatorial election was 2009, and the 2010 midterm election that followed it featured a massive “Republican Wave” that saw the GOP pick up 64 seats in the house, the largest shift since 1948. Republicans made other gains nationwide including 6 senate seats, 6 governorships, and a staggering 20 state legislative chambers. Given how the national political circumstances in 2009 mirror the current ones, it’s worth exploring the various similarities between them.
Both Obama and Biden are moderate Democrats who successfully appealed to working class voters and swung into office the previous year on lofty promises of reaching across the aisle and setting the country back on track following a major crisis while controlling Congress. Within months of being elected, opposition materialized to each administration’s major goals, severely limiting their ability to govern and get legislation passed. The major pieces of legislation each administration managed to pass (Obamacare and the American Rescue Plan respectively) became highly polarized with each bill framed by the right as a socialist spending spree, strengthening the Republicans even further. According to Gallup, both presidents suffered major drops in their approval rating their first year in office, and were at relative lows when the off-year elections rolled around. Obama’s approval rating continued to fall preceding the midterm elections, allowing for Republicans to take a significant victory at the polls.
It’s hardly news to anyone’s ears that things are looking bleak for Democrats right now in terms of the 2022 midterms. The odds are stacked against us, so how do we respond? How do Democrats prevent the not so distant past from repeating itself and leave the ballot box in 2022 with their heads held high? I believe many of the answers lie in McCaullife’s defeat. Democrats can’t sound like a broken record, replaying the same slogans in every election in every year. So much can change within a single election cycle, so unlike McCauliffe, 2022 candidates need to focus on the issues that matter most to the electorate at that moment and they need to tailor their message to their localities and neighborhoods. In addition, 2022 candidates cannot repeat McCaullife’s mistake of disregarding the concerns of their constituents. Candidates need to listen to and properly address the concerns of average people - especially on emotionally charged issues such as education - rather than ignore and insult them. I am by no means saying they should compromise, but candidates should do a better job of working to sell their ideas to a wider audience beyond their base, including to those who may initially be on the fence about or disagree with the party platform.
Messaging was important, but the critical aspect of Virginia’s election that did McCauliffe in was turnout. Republicans were far more energized than anyone expected in 2021 and turned out in drones, and given their dissatisfaction with the Biden administration, they will certainly do the same in 2022. For us to stand a chance in 2022, propelling high turnout is the single most important thing we can do. We cannot be complicit just because we control congress and the presidency now, we must fight like hell and leave no stone unturned when it comes to driving turnout. Registering unregistered voters and encouraging voters - particularly groups with low turnout such as young voters and voters of color - has the potential to win close elections when done right; just look at what Stacey Abrams and her networks accomplished in Georgia. If Democrats can mimic that nationwide, as well as sound the sirens as loud as possible that they are in serious trouble, Democrats may stand a chance. It is up to us - students, activists, community organizers - to make this a reality. Now’s not the time for the progress Democrats have made to be reset and reversed. As the old saying goes, “those who do not learn from history are bound to repeat it.” We must learn from our mistakes in Virginia, or else we are doomed to fail once again.