A New Democratic Campaign Strategy: An End, Not a Means

Elizabeth Grubb, Staff Writer & President of Cal Dems 

I find myself more and more frustrated with the fact that campaigns are treated as a stepping stone to reform, rather than a mechanism of reform. The typical logic I hear from Democratic campaigns is: “We need to elect a Democrat then we push for reforms (that are long overdue).” Why not campaign in a way that actually produces material changes, regardless of the success of a candidate? Especially because the success of a candidate almost feels null at this point with the amount of partisan gridlock and Democratic moderate-pleasing tendencies. 

Amidst the 2020 election cycle, I found myself searching for a topic for an independent research project. I was curious as to how we could increase low-income voter turnout—was there a technique that we hadn’t thought of yet? The answer was yes, but it wasn’t what I expected—I’ll get to that later. Academic and public policy research has produced many solutions to increasing low-income turnout. These are virtually all structural solutions: move election day to the weekend, paid time off for voting, online voting, an election holiday, better civic education, among others. Undeniably, structural change is needed, however, the problem lies in the path to structural change. It is assumed that first you must campaign well, win the election, and then bring forth every single one of your campaign promises. Do this and society flourishes, right? Wrong. Politicians, once elected, rarely deliver on their campaign promises whether it is because of our political climate or other reasons. And so begins a cycle of pouring our efforts into a campaign for its eventual promises and being let down. 

A prime example of this is President Biden. Progressive Democrats were constantly reprimanded for criticizing Biden’s campaign before he was elected. Well, Biden’s first hundred days have raced past us and he has delivered on very few of his first 100 day promises, let alone his overarching campaign promises. Halfway through his first 100 days, PBS found that Biden had only delivered on 19 of his 61 promises. Of course, partisan gridlock is partly to blame. However, progress on some of the campaign promises most important to progressives—immigration and racial equity—have been painfully dismal. So now that we worked hard to elect President Biden, will we ever see these promises materialize?

Democrats -- why not enact desired reforms as you campaign? Why wait till our candidate is in office when we know they are often unable to deliver campaign promises? Why not revolutionize the way we campaign? If we are to actualize the liberal ideals we tout, we as Democrats must adopt a bottom-up approach and reimagine campaigns as a tool for reform.

The Two Campaign Strategies

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There are two main campaign strategies: the persuasion approach and the base mobilization approach. The persuasion approach is an older strategy maintaining that 80% of campaign resources should be dedicated to appealing to the moderate voter and 20% of the campaign’s resources should be given to reliable partisans and demographics. On the other hand, the base mobilization approach, which is gaining popularity, essentially funnels 100% of its resources on mobilizing its base and not persuading moderate and undecided voters. This approach aims to excite voters by engaging with community members and participating in large voter registration initiatives, like that of Stacey Abrams in Georgia. Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders are relevant examples of candidates with a base mobilization approach. 

Following Democratic victories in the 2020 election, pundits and politicians alike have squabbled over what strategy contributed to the success of Biden and the Democratic Party as a whole. Many moderate Democrats believe Biden was the ideal candidate to win over moderates and even pragmatic Republicans, unknowingly drawing upon the persuasion approach. Meanwhile, progressive Democrats contended that a base mobilization approach was the key to ousting Trump, frequently citing the stunning victory in Georgia.

While the 2020 Presidential Election was most likely a success due to both types of campaign strategies, I observe several issues with the persuasion approach. The persuasion campaign is rooted in political science’s conception of the median voter. Political scientists conceptualize political views on a singular left-right spectrum. They posit that most voters are located near the middle of the political spectrum and therefore, a candidate, regardless of party, should position themselves near the center of the spectrum to appease these moderates and, as a result, attract the largest amount of votes. This strategy is presupposed on the belief that voters will make the rational choice and vote for the candidate that best represents their views on the left-right spectrum. By aiming for the middle, a campaign should be able to gain more votes than if they position themselves near either pole. In actuality, this is not the case.

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The persuasion approach also fails to allocate resources to mobilizing low-propensity voters or unregistered individuals.

First, the idea of the rational voter is flawed—humans are not purely rational actors AND the rationality of a particular choice is subjective. Second, there are multiple dimensions to voter preference and each dimension can be valued differently. This makes the left-right spectrum far too simple to capture voter’s sentiments collectively. Fourth, we are living in a highly polarized society, whereby individual voters are gravitating towards opposite poles and yet many campaigns aim for the political center making the central claim of this strategy moot. Lastly, the median voter theorem prioritizes certain voters over others; low-income and BIPOC voters are generally excluded from this method because campaigns spend the majority of their resources persuading moderate and independent voters. Consequently, there are very few resources left to register voters and reach out to low-income and BIPOC voters.

I believe we need to ditch the persuasion approach for base mobilization, but it needs to go beyond that. We need to pressure campaigns to enact the changes they promise along the way: voter registration, appealing to low-income and BIPOC individuals, paying staff livable wages, and practicing diversity in hiring. In an age of ineffective government, the campaign is our greatest tool for effecting change. Campaigns should be more than a means to an end. Campaigns should be an end in themselves (and if they win, even better). 

My Research

Through my research project, I settled on examining the relationship between the effect of a candidate running on progressive economic policies and low-income voter turnout. My hope was to discover a link between the two, which would spell out the need for campaigns to champion issues important to low-income communities. In short, I selected campaigns with progressive economic policies that had opponents with opposing views, isolating the independent variable. In order to measure the effect of the independent variable, I collected voter turnout data from the same states for several years to establish a normal rate of turnout and I combed through exit polls to establish any changes in the composition of the electorate by income groups.

After collecting this data, I found that every single one of my selected campaigns saw an increase in voter turnout compared to the average-- in some cases the increase was quite substantial. Research indicates that higher turnout is indicative of a greater low-income turnout.

One striking race that I examined was Andy Beshear’s gubernatorial race in Kentucky. He was running against Governor Matt Bevin who had cut public school funding and reduced teachers’ pensions, while Beshear ran on protecting healthcare and public education funding. His campaign was helped by the Poor People’s Campaign, who employed a method of “fusion politics,” which entails interacting with voters and talking about how policies impact them directly. The Poor People’s Campaign brought together a large coalition that canvassed tirelessly, registering voters and talking about pressing issues. In the end, Beshear unseated the incumbent and voter turnout increased by 46% compared to the prior gubernatorial race indicating that more low-income voters participated in that election. 

I believe that these findings are indicative that a bottom-up approach to reform is possible. Campaigning on issues important to low-income voters is just one way that the campaign can act as a reformatory mechanism; I hope this serves as a model for the many ways campaigns can challenge the status quo.

A New Campaign Strategy for Democrats 

This new approach would have a couple important implications. First, I believe that this new approach would spell out more victories for Democrats, even in areas we typically consider red and unflippable (i.e. Georgia prior to 2020). In fact the Poor People’s Campaign reports that if  low-income Americans participated in elections at the same rate of their wealthier counterparts, poor voters would match or exceed the margins of the 2016 Presidential race in 15 states, including Texas, Florida, and Mississippi. Moreover, the book Who Votes Now finds that nonvoters tend to be politically left-leaning. So, in terms of electoral math, a base mobilization campaign with an appeal to low-income voters spells out an innovative and successful strategy for Democrats. 

Secondly, and most importantly, this approach would make low-income individuals a constituency that politicians on both sides will finally have to answer to. Conversely, if politicians are finally delivering on promises to low-income voters, these voters will benefit from better policies and have all the more reason to vote in the next election. This positive feedback loop would essentially enfranchise low-income voters. I think this approach is a winning one, and my research supports this. But if it is not a winning strategy, at least some progress is made in exciting an electorate and registering new voters.

If Democrats want economic justice, campaigns should prioritize low-income voters and not just their wealthiest donors. If Democrats want to encourage young people to participate in politics, campaigns should start paying their interns-- a measly stipend, or nothing at all, does not cut it. If Democrats are pushing for a $15 minimum wage, campaigns should start paying their staff an actually livable wage. If Democrats desire racial and gender equity, campaigns should start by diversifying who they hire and who leads a campaign. Campaigns can and should be an end in themselves. So, let’s wield campaigns as a powerful tool for radically challenging the status quo.  It is time to stop waiting for campaign promises to materialize; it is time for campaigns to take actionable steps to those goals. 

Elizabeth Grubb